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Abstract: Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the 
anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above 
marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the 
costs of production (synergies). However, demand-side effects of synergies are usually 
neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by 
assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific 
synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers 
are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment 
economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger 
control are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The welfare analysis of mergers usually consists of two elements: the allocative effect and the 
efficiency effect. While the former refers to the welfare loss due to the narrowing of the 
market structure (dead weight loss), the latter analyses the effect of efficiency gains from 
mergers.
1 Such efficiency gains typically originate from synergy effects of the integration of 
two or more companies to a single entity, i.e. an (assumed) constant output can post-merger 
be produced with fewer inputs, for instance due to the amalgamation of overhead and 
administration departments like human resources, accounting, executive committee, etc. 
According to standard M&A business economics, the reduction of staff represents an 
important source of such kinds of synergy gains.  
The usual way of modelling efficiency gains from mergers in industrial economics is to 
analyse the effects from a merger-fuelled decrease in marginal costs. However, in doing so, 
the analysis of the synergy effects remains limited to the supply side of the relevant markets 
(shifts of the supply curve). In contrast, possible effects on the demand side, for instance 
leading to a shift of the demand curve, are usually neglected. We contribute to filling this gap 
by introducing the demand effects from synergy-driven mergers to a standard welfare analysis 
of horizontal mergers in oligopolies. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers 
are substantially decreased, sometimes even completely eroded, if involuntary unemployment 
exists. In full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible.  
2. Literature Overview 
There is surprisingly few literature dealing with mergers/competition and unemployment. The 
larger branch is empirical and addresses the employment effects of mergers. The most 
comprehensive studies are Conyon et al. (2002) and Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004). Conyon et al. 
                                                 
1 This type of trade-off analysis was pioneered by Williamson (1968) and is immanent in most landmark 
contributions to the modern economic analysis of horizontal mergers (e.g. Farrell & Shapiro 1990, 2001).   2
(2002) find for the UK that mergers and acquisitions lead to a significant decrease in labour 
demand by the merged entity (that also decreases joint output) compared to the pre-merger 
situation.
2 This result is generally supported by Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) finding significant 
and considerable negative effects of merger activity in Europe (in average a 10 per cent 
decrease in labour demand). However, and in line with earlier studies (Green & Cromley 
1982; Upadhyaya & Mixon 2003), they do not find negative effects of merger activity on the 
unemployment rate in the US. As an explanation, Gugler & Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that 
more rigid and more sclerotic labour markets in Europe compared to the U.S. drive the effect. 
This view is additionally supported by the case study from Behar & Hodge (2007). Margolis 
(2006) finds evidence that mergers and acquisitions lead to a reduction in the employment 
particularly of (comparatively) ‘low-skilled’ workers, a finding that fits into this line of reason 
as sclerotic labour markets usually exert an over-proportionally adverse effect on low-skilled 
labour. Altogether, this empirically strengthens the reasoning that countries with persistent 
involuntary unemployment and sclerotic labour markets experience negative employment 
effects from increasing merger activity because the employees that lose their job in the course 
of post-merger rationalisation cannot find a new job. Thus, those economies suffer 
(consumer) income-wise from mergers & acquisitions. 
Most analyses in the theoretical literature in this context focus on the influence of the intensity 
of competition on unemployment and/or the determination of wages. One line of reasoning 
concerns imperfections on labour markets: then, promotional effects of intensified product 
market competition on employment are not a matter of course (Koskela & Stenbacka 2005). 
In another respect, the landmark work of d'Aspremont et al. (1984, 1989a, 1989b, 1990) 
focuses on the explanation of involuntary unemployment based on an extended Cournot 
oligopoly model, thereby taking into account the interdependencies between labour and 
                                                 
2 This study somewhat generalises an earlier sector-specific study by Haynes & Thompson (1999) that also finds 
negative employment effects, however, only after an initial temporary increase in labour demand.   3
product markets.
3 Producers are assumed to behave according to their ‘true’ demand curve, 
i.e. taking into account the total income effect of their decisions on altering the level of 
employment. Involuntary unemployment then results from market imperfections in the 
product markets – even at a zero wage – due to bounded labour demand. Unemployment does 
not rest on the assumption of an imperfectly competitive labour market and is more likely the 
lower is the degree of competition in product markets. Even though their focus is totally 
different because we do not try to explain the existence of involuntary unemployment, the 
possible dependence of producers’ decisions on total income – mentioned by d’Aspremont et 
al. – plays a crucial role in our following analysis, in which we regard aspects of mergers and 
total welfare in a given involuntary unemployment environment.  
Though total welfare effects of mergers are not discussed, Schniewind (2000) analyses the 
effect of mergers on unemployment in a partial equilibrium Cournot competition model. 
Contrary to our model, a rise in total factor productivity due to a merger leads to a positive 
effect on employment. This positive effect is counteracted by a mark-up effect due to lower 
competition. As a result, lower growth in total factor productivity, a smaller number of firms 
and a larger sector size confirm a negative net impact of mergers on unemployment. 
Furthermore, Gersbach (2000) derives that intensifying product market competition leads to 
more employment in most cases (in particular if it is done via reducing mark-ups or inducing 
a more rapid expansion of the product mix). Only if productivity increases are combined with 
rigid labour markets (for instance, workers are immobile), mixed or negative results might 
occur. The idea that a lessening of competition promotes involuntary unemployment is 
compatible with our reasoning as soon as horizontal mergers actually lead to a lessening of 
competition.  Brock & Obst (2008) broaden the scope of welfare analysis of mergers by 
integrating consumer preferences about the desired degree of market concentration, implying 
                                                 
3 In d'Aspremont et al. (1990) the analysis is done for imperfect price competition.   4
that preferences for deconcentrated markets lead to a more rigorous optimal horizontal merger 
policy. However, effects on unemployment are not considered. 
Of course, there is a vast literature on welfare effects of horizontal mergers and we will draw 
on the landmark contributions of this field.
4 In particular, we consider a standard Cournot 
setting and our model resembles in parts the model of Salant et al. (1983). However, to our 
best knowledge, no treatment of the welfare effects of (horizontal) mergers including the 
welfare effects from a merger-specific increase in involuntary unemployment is available. 
3. Synergies, Unemployment and Demand 
Procompetitive advantages from a merger for the merging companies result from efficiency 
gains through synergies. Following the standard view in economics, synergies arise from the 
combination and integration of specific, hard-to-trade assets of the particular merging firms. 
This combination allows the new merged firm to produce with lower costs compared to the 
case of separate independent firms. Farrell & Shapiro (2001: 693) state the requirement of 
combining the firms’ assets as follows: “synergies allow output/cost configurations that would 
not be feasible otherwise.” In the literature on business economics, topologies of synergies are 
used in differing ways. In some studies (e.g. Chatterjee 1986; Seth 1990; Fulghieri & Hodrick 
2006), market power effects of horizontal mergers are included, for instance under the label 
‘price synergies’. However, this received critical reflection as it blurs the distinction between 
anticompetitive (market power) and procompetitive (efficiencies through synergies) effects of 
mergers, a distinction that is very useful for analyses from a welfare point of view. In 
accordance with other industrial economics literature, we therefore do not consider market 
power effects to be a type of synergies (inter alia Clougherty & Duso 2008). As a 
                                                 
4 Actually, the literature is much too comprehensive to be summarized in a few paragraphs. For elaborate and 
contemporary overviews see Kaplow & Shapiro (2007); Froeb & Werden (2008); Kerber & Schwalbe (2008); 
Kühn (2008).   5
consequence, five basic categories of synergies can be identified (Chatterjee 1986; Trautwein 
1990; Fulghieri & Hodrick 2006). 
Type of Synergy  Kind of Cost Reduction  Example(s) 
Production Synergies  economies of scale 
degression of fixed costs; 
convergence to optimal 
capital utilization; etc. 
Operational Synergies  economies of scope 
combining administrative 
functions; integration of 
departments; reduction of 




market for corporate control) 
replacing the target 
management by the 
management of the acquirer; 
etc. 
Financial Synergies  capital costs 
lower interest rates on 
borrowed capital; improved 




complementary skills / 
resources 




Irrespective of the type of synergy, a merger-specific increase in productivity (efficiency 
increase) implies that an (assumed) constant output is produced with fewer inputs
5 – at the 
end of the day with fewer input of factors of production. Looking at the five categories of 
synergies, this directly relates to the input factor labour in case of production, operational and 
administrative synergies. In case of financial synergies, there is no obvious relation to the 
factor labour. In case of complementarities synergies, the implications for labour input are not 
trivial. 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, an assumed constant input allows for a higher output.   6
Let us assume horizontal mergers that increase efficiency through production and operational 
synergies.
6 This stands in line with empirical research on motives and effects of efficiency-
enhancing horizontal mergers and acquisitions (inter alia Seth 1990; Mukherjee et al. 2004).
7 
Assuming partially substitutional production functions, the amount of the relative reduction of 
input factors corresponds to the relative price of the input factors. If the relative price of one 
input factor (say labour) increases, then productivity gains are especially profitable if they 
economize on that factor. This mirrors the rationale that business, while seeking to economize 
on all input factors, puts the strongest efforts behind reducing the most expensive input factor, 
i.e. increasing its productivity. Regarding mergers and acquisitions, this implies that high 
relative labour price induces mergers to focus on the elimination of duplicate jobs in order to 
decrease costs by increasing labour productivity. Typically, deficient labour market 
institutions (overly high reservation wages, excessive labour rights, over-taxation, overpriced 
social security, etc.) tend to artificially increase the relative price of labour. This interrelation 
will be addressed in more detail below. 
Following the preceding paragraph, we assume that the reduction of costs c of the new 
merged firm compared to its constituent firms is due to a reduction of the input factor labour 
(in relation to a constant output level). Thus, given a general production function f with input 
factors labour (L), capital (K) and other inputs (φ), the merger can be expressed in the amount 
of employed labour pre-merger and post-merger,   and  pre post LL , whereby  pre L  encompasses 
the sum of employed labour of the merger-constituent firms: 
  ( ,,) ( ,,) post post pre pre fLK f L K ϕϕ = , with  post pre LL <  and  ( ,,) ( ,,) post pre cL K cL K ϕϕ < . 
                                                 
6 As the quantitative effect of replacing the target management should not be considerable in terms of labour 
input, we further on neglect this type of synergy. 
7 In contrast, Chatterjee (1992) finds financial synergies to be more important than operational and production 
synergies. Notwithstanding, the latter two represent non-negligible ingredients.   7
Efficient mergers imply increased labour productivity, i.e. a constant market output is 
produced with a reduced input of labour, thereby production costs have been reduced. Note 
that this does not necessarily require the merged company to reduce its labour demand in 
absolute terms. Due to its increased efficiency, the merged entity might increase its output 
corresponding to an increased market share. However, this does not contradict our assumption 
that any given market output is produced with less labour input post-merger compared to the 
pre-merger situation. The merged company merely increases its share within the market at the 
expense of less efficient (i.e. lower labour productivity) competitors, implying that the 
average labour productivity of all producers within the relevant market has increased and 
labour input at any given output has market-wide decreased. 
The merger-specific cost reduction is present in standard analysis of the welfare effect of 
horizontal mergers and will be included in a standard way in our model (section 4). However, 
the consequent implication on input demand, here: labour demand, is usually neglected. This 
seems to be justified if a full-employment economy is (implicitly) assumed. Workers and 
employees that lose their job as a consequence of, for instance, operational synergies 
(reduction of staff in post-merger integrated overhead departments) will find a new job in 
another industry. However, labour markets do not always work perfectly. In a considerable 
number of countries, they are characterized by mismatch problems, deficient institutions as 
well as tax and social security systems that artificially increase the price of labour – leading to 
involuntary unemployment. In line with the empirical research discussed in section 2, we 
demonstrate that dropping the usual (implicit) full employment-economy assumption in 
favour of an involuntary unemployment-economy assumption alters the welfare implications 
of horizontal mergers. In an economy with involuntary unemployment, sclerotic labour 
markets mean that laid-off workers and employees do not easily find a new job and face 
considerable periods of unemployment instead. Unemployment usually goes along with losses   8
of income.
8 Increasing unemployment in such a scenario consequently implies a reduction of 
income of consumers. And thus, by reducing total income Y, involuntary unemployment 
affects total demand D. 
To state this more clearly, total income is simply expressed as a function of labour L and all 
non-labour income elements θ: 
  (,) YY L θ = , 
with 0 L Y′ >  denoting the first partial derivative of Y with respect to L. The above explanations 
then allow for the reasoning that the effect of an unemployment-caused reduction of total 
income on total demand is not passed through one-to-one. In our following model we, 
therefore, implicitly assume a so called “pass through”-factor a, capturing the effect on the 
change of total demand D: 
  DaY Δ=⋅ Δ, 
whereby total demand is a function of the price p, total income Y and other factors R that 
determine total demand. The demand of a given industry or in a given market  ˆ D is in turn a 
share of total demand. We assume that  ˆ D evolves parallel to total demand, i.e. we assume for 
reasons of simplicity that consumers facing a reduction in income change the size of their 
shopping basket but not its composition. 
This links employed labour and total demand in a given industry. General involuntary 
unemployment renders counterbalancing of a discharge of labour within that industry (due to 
merger-specific synergies) by other industries impossible. Therefore, the merger causes 
                                                 
8 A negative income effect occurs even if social security systems provide a subsistence level of income for the 
unemployed, financed by taxes or social security contributions, as long as that subsistence level is lower than the 
wage level. In addition, involuntary unemployment reduces demand by creating negative expectations about 
future income.   9
unemployment to rise and total income to fall. The latter, in effect, reduces total demand 
faced by the merging firms and its competitors. 
4. The Model 
4.1 Pre-Merger Equilibrium 
We use a simple model of Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods. Inverse demand  ˆ D is 
given by  ( ) p XR Y b X =−, where X is total industry output, p is price, Y is total income, R 
denotes all other factors than total income, and  ( ) 0 pX ′ <  denoting the first derivative of 
price with respect to total industry output. The number of firms is exogenous and given by n. 
Firm i’s output is given by  i x  and 
1
n
i i X x
= = . It is further assumed that the n firms have 
equal marginal costs c and no fixed costs.
9 
In the standard Cournot equilibrium, every firm i maximizes its profits, 
(,)[() ] iii i x yp X c x π =− , over its output  i x , given its rivals’ output  i y . It follows that total 
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4.2 Post-Merger Equilibrium 
Now, two of the previously existing n firms merge, thereby reducing the marginal costs of the 
new entity (insider I) due to synergies to cε, with 0 < ε < 1. The marginal costs of the 
remaining n – 2 firms (outsiders O) remain at c. It is assumed that the synergies rest on the 
                                                 
9 Positive fixed costs do not change the general analysis and implications, besides enforcing the below examined 
effects.   10
economization of labour input. Due to sclerotic labour markets, involuntary unemployment is 
increased and this causes total income to fall to YY <  . The amount of Y   comprises the “pass 
through”-effect of an unemployment-caused reduction of total income on demand in the 
modelled market: the higher is  Y  , the lower is the proportion of change in total income 
passed through onto the relevant market. Thus, inverse demand is now given by 
() p XR Y b X =−    , where  X   is new total industry output,  p   is the new price,  ( ) 0 pX ′ <   , and 
the other parameters R stay the same as in the pre-merger case. 
In the new Cournot equilibrium, outputs of the insider and the outsiders are given by 
(2 ) ( 1) (2 )
  and   IO
RY c nc RY c
xx
bn bn
εε ε +− + − +−
==

, respectively, with  IO x x > . Thus, total 
industry output of 
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(2 ) IO
















  . 
For ( ) p X    to be higher than  () p X  it must hold that 
(2) ( ) ( 2) ( 1) nR Y R Y R Y n c n c ε −+ > + − +  . 
The partial derivates of the difference given in (2) show that a higher value of Y   and ε (i.e. a 
smaller shift in the demand curve and the insiders’ cost function) as well as lower values of n 
and c (i.e. fewer players in the market and lower market-wide marginal costs) support a price 
increase due to the merger.
10 Thereby, (very) low market-wide marginal costs convey a lower 
price-reducing potential of synergies (compared to the effect of increased market power). 
                                                 
10 The partial derivatives of the difference in (4) are given by: 
( 1 ) 0, ( 1 ) 0,  ( 1 ) 0,  ( 1 ) 2 0 nR nc R Y R Y c n nc Y
εε ε ε
∂∂ ∂ ∂ =+ > =+ > = − −−< = − + − < ∂∂ ∂ ∂

 .   11
Total welfare (W  ) is now given by the sum of consumer surplus, the profit of the insider and 
the profits of the  2 n−  outsider firms. Thus, 
2
2
[(1 )( 2 ) ]
2
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(3)  (2 )
I O WC S n ππ =++ −    
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4.3 Total Welfare Effect 
The merger’s effect on total welfare is determined by the comparison of post-merger and pre-
merger total welfare,  WWW Δ=−  . It is obvious that this comparison will lead to a very 
complex expression that cannot be interpreted in a trivial way and that does not allow for an 
easy generalizing condition.
11 
Recalling our aim to show total welfare impacts of mergers that include a negative effect of 
synergies on total demand, we first should mention that those mergers display the “normal” 
impact of mergers in such a Cournot-setting, i.e. the mergers’ effects on total welfare under 
the above conditions with the “normal” unaffected demand function (this is due to the partial 
derivative of W   with respect to Y  ,  0 WY ∂∂ >  ).
12 Thus, ignoring effects on total demand 
attenuates (and possibly reverses) negative total welfare effects and overestimates positive 
total welfare effects. This emphasizes the importance of an inclusion of demand-side effects 
into a welfare-maximizing merger policy. 
                                                 
11 The latter is possible if the effect on consumer surplus is isolated:  0 CS CS CS Δ=−>    ⇔ 
2 [( 1 ) 2 ] ( ) cn n R Y R Y R Y εε −+ −> − +  . 
12 A sufficient condition for  0 WY ∂∂ >   is given by: 
22 2 (1 ) RYn c R n −>  .   12
We simulate some welfare effects (with different parameter constellations) of mergers that 
include demand-side effects in the Appendix. Thereby, the results follow „normal“ Cournot-
settings, i.e. it is easier to conclude a negative welfare effect of those mergers. A smaller shift 
of the demand curve, a higher reduction of marginal costs and a higher number of active firms 
lower and may offset this negative total welfare effect. 
Furthermore, a very steep demand curve (higher values of b) leads to a decrease of the 
absolute value of  W Δ  (this is due to the same qualitative effect of an increased b on W and 
W  ). It should be noted that a positive total welfare effect is based on increased profits of the 
firms; consumers only do not suffer from those mergers if there is almost no demand-side 
effect, the number of active firms in the market is very high and the insider realizes an 
excessive reduction in marginal costs. 
5. Policy Implications and Further Research Questions 
In summary, we find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are substantially 
decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment economies, 
demand-side effects remain negligible. This result stands in line with the available empirical 
evidence reported in section 2, finding negative employment effects of mergers in 
unemployment economies but not in full employment economies. Now, what are the 
implications of our theoretical analysis? We structure them in three categories: (i) policy 
implications in a narrow sense, (ii) more general policy implications and (iii) demand for 
further research. 
5.1 Narrow Policy Implications 
Our model demonstrates that a welfare-maximising merger control agency should not neglect 
demand-side effects of mergers in the face of involuntary unemployment. The total welfare 
effect of a synergy-causing merger where the synergies rely on a post-merger economisation   13
on labour input is systematically decreased in such an economic environment. Mergers that 
produce a sufficiently small positive welfare effect when ignoring the demand effect can be 
welfare-reducing when taking demand-side effects into account. Thus, ignoring demand-side 
effects is likely to cause some false positives (allowances of welfare-reducing mergers) in an 
unemployment economy. 
Since the demand-side effect only affects economies with involuntary unemployment, the 
policy implications are ‘only’ relevant for merger control authorities in such economies (and 
not for such in full employment economies). In economies with involuntary unemployment, 
the consideration of demand-side effects implies caution towards the inclusion of cost-
decreasing effects in the evaluation of merger proposals (since they were at least partially 
eroded by the decrease in demand). In other words, merger control authorities should be more 
careful to allow an otherwise anticompetitive merger due to (productive) efficiency gains 
through (labour-input related) synergies than merger control authorities in full employment 
economies. 
Note, however, the counter-argument that it might be more appropriate to attack the labour 
market deficiencies with economic policy instruments than adjusting merger control. While 
possessing merit from an ideal perspective, labour market reforms that turn persistently 
sclerotic labour markets into perfectly workable ones seem to be somewhat unrealistic, 
probably due to political economy reasons. As a consequence, a merger control authority in 
an economy characterized by involuntary unemployment must deal with the situation as it is 
and as long as it remains. Under these conditions, neglecting demand-side effects might 
further decrease welfare. 
A point of qualification must be considered. The share of the income loss due to increased 
involuntary unemployment that actually transfers to demand in the market of the 
concentration might be rather small and in many cases even look negligible. However, this   14
does not imply that the negative effect does not occur since other industries are adversely 
affected instead. For reasons of simplicity, we waived an integration of cross-market effects in 
our theoretical analysis, since it merely scatters the effects (without effecting their total scale) 
and complicates the analysis but does not change the results.  
5.2 More General Policy Implications 
It is a widespread opinion among economists that merger control should focus only on 
competition effects and exclude other ‘non-competition’ factors like preserving diversity of 
firms and products, promoting market integration, fairness considerations as well as 
employment effects (Motta 2004: 17-30; Carlton & Perloff 2005: 634-637).
13 However, our 
model shows that an unrestricted welfare goal of antitrust policy cannot exclude employment 
effects. If involuntary unemployment exists, then the employment effects of a merger 
influence welfare and, thus, belong into the welfare evaluation of a merger proposal. In this 
regard, employment effects do not represent a non-competition factor if competition is 
equalled with (total) welfare! 
Taking a total welfare standard for merger control (exemplary for other competition policy 
areas) seriously, implies that the distinction between ‘competition’ and ‘non-competition’ 
effects becomes somewhat blurred since (almost) every merger-specific effect somehow 
affects welfare. This is particularly visible in our example: technically, the difference between 
cost efficiencies and unemployment-related income effects is merely that in the first case the 
supply function is shifted while in the second case the demand function is shifted. There is no 
obvious or trivial reason to discriminate between these two effects in terms of ‘competition’ 
versus ‘non-competition’ factor. 
                                                 
13 These textbooks reflect the mainstream thought on both sides of the Atlantic. For recent and more 
controversial contributions to this issue see inter alia Schmidt 2001; Fox 2003; Foer 2006; Heyer 2006; Carlton 
2007; Budzinski 2008; Kirchner 2008; Kerber 2009.   15
5.3 Demand for Further Research 
While our model only refers to conditional employment effects, the overall implication might 
be more far-reaching. The number of effects from mergers that possibly affects welfare in 
some ways might be quite extensive. For instance in a recent study, Garmaise & Moskowitz 
(2006) find empirical evidence that bank mergers generally yield effects like income 
reduction and increasing poverty crime – both of which certainly negatively affect total 
welfare. Similar considerations seem plausible for other so-called ‘non-competition’ factors 
like preserving diversity of firms and products or promoting market integration whereas in 
cases of others, like fairness considerations, it might seem more implausible. In any case, 
theoretical literature on the welfare effects of such kinds of merger consequences is largely 
missing up to date. Further research is necessary to fill this gap and complete the welfare 
analysis of mergers. 
Given the difficulties of assessing the welfare effects in real-world merger cases even in the 
currently dominating two-dimensional framework (market power effect and supply-side cost-
reduction effect), another research question might gain relevance: do unlimited welfare 
standards represent an appropriate and wise goal for competition policy in theory and in 
practice? 
6. Concluding Summary 
Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the 
anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above 
marginal costs whereas the procompetitive efficiency effect increases welfare by reducing the 
costs of production (synergies). However, demand-side effects of synergies are usually 
neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by 
assuming a (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific   16
synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers 
are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment 
economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. These model results stand in line with 
existing empirical research.  
Policy conclusions include that merger control authorities in economies with involuntary 
unemployment should be (more) reluctant to allow market power increasing mergers 
(compared to such in full employment economies) because of supply-side efficiency gains 
since they might be offset by welfare-reducing demand-side effects. In a more general 
context, the presented analysis indicates the necessity for a reappraisal of the popular 
distinction between ‘competition’ and ‘non-competition’ factors in merger control. 
Furthermore, it shows that additional research about welfare effects of mergers and the effects 
of unlimited welfare standards on merger control policy is needed. 
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Appendix 
N c ε R b Y  Y   W Δ  
4 1  0.95  1  0.75  10  9.995  -1.0814 
4 1  0.8  1  0.75  10  9.995  -0.4833 
4 1  0.68  1  0.75  10  9.995  0.0262 
4 1  0.68  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.0112 
         
4 1  0.75  1  0.75  10  9.995  -0.2744 
5 1  0.75  1  0.75  10  9.995  0.067 
5 1  0.75  1  1.25  10  9.995  0.0402 
5 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.0287 
         
4 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.1176 
4 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.3801 
         
4 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.995  -0.6651 
4 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.9  -1.465 
         
5 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.9  -1.1328 
5 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.9  -0.6473 
6 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.9  -0.5642 
6 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.9  -0.9874 
6 1  0.9  1  0.75  10  9.9  -1.3165 
         
6 1  0.83  1  1.25  10  9.995  -0.017 
6 1  0.83  1  1.25  10  9.999  0.0111 
6 1  0.83  1  0.75  10  9.999  0.0186 
6 1  0.9  1  0.75  10  9.999  -0.1654 
6 1  0.9  1  1.25  10  9.999  -0.0992 
8 1  0.89  1  0.75  10  9.999  0.0107 
8 1  0.89  1  1.25  10  9.999  0.0064 
         
6 1  0.98  1  1.25  10  9.999  -0.2175 
6 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.1554 
5 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.2629 
         
3 1  0.98  1  1.75  10  9.999  -1.0837 
3 1  0.9  1  1.75  10  9.999  -0.8975 
3 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.999  -1.5707 
         
3 1  0.9  1 1 10  9.9  -2.3626 
3 1  0.53  1 1 10  9.999  0.0381 
3 1  0.53  1  1.75  10  9.999  0.0217 
         
3 1  0.53  1  1.75  10  9.995  0.003 
3 1  0.75  1  1.75  10  9.995  -0.5549 
 
For our simple simulation of the welfare effects of mergers that include demand-side effects, 
we generally concentrate on the variation of the parameters n,  ε,  b and Y  . All other 
parameters are held constant.   20
In the above table the last column indicates the net total welfare effect and positive (negative) 
values of  W Δ  indicate a positive (negative) welfare effect of those mergers. The simulation is 
partitioned in several parts to isolate some effects of the respective parameters: 
−  At first, increased efficiencies due to the merger (i.e. reducing marginal costs) lower and 
may offset (for very high efficiencies) a negative welfare effect. The last row indicates 
that the absolute value of  W Δ  decreases according to a steeper demand curve. 
−  A higher number of active firms raise the critical level of efficiency gains, and, 
accordingly, a positive welfare effect may be reached more ‘easily’. 
−  The third part, again, shows the effect of a steeper demand curve on the absolute value of 
W Δ  (these values must be compared with the corresponding values of the first part). 
−  Increasing the demand-side effect, i.e. lowering Y  , has an unambiguously negative effect 
on total welfare. Increasing the number of firms (see the fifth part) only attenuates this 
effect that, again, also holds for a steeper demand curve. 
−  In the sixth part it is demonstrated that even for a negligible shift of the demand curve and 
a ‘normal’ oligopoly situation the efficiency effects crucially determine the possibility of a 
positive total welfare effect. Even for such a number of firms the reduction in marginal 
costs must be comparatively high. The last two parts indicate the extreme magnitude 
needed to positively affect total welfare if the number of active firms is very low. 
In summary, a smaller shift of the demand curve, a higher reduction of marginal costs and a 
higher number of active firms lower and may offset a negative total welfare effect. 
Furthermore, a very steep demand curve (higher values of b) leads to a decrease of the 
absolute value of  W Δ . 
 